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GRIGGS ON SPIN CYCLE: A COMMENTARY ON
PROFESSOR GRAGLIA'S RACIAL PREFERENCES,
QUOTAS, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The opening sentence of Professor Graglia's attack on disparate
impact theory is telling, and rather sad. It betrays a deeply nihilistic
view of the world. In fact, it reminds me of the immortal words of
Republican political consultant Lee Atwater, who before his death
remarked, "bullshit has permeated our society at every level ....
[S]tatus is bullshit, and status is a new value. Bullshit permeates
everything." 1 A veritable poet of nihilism, Atwater was perhaps
most famous for devising the infamous Willie Horton campaign
commercials. Professor Graglia shows himself to be a sort of Lee
Atwater of law professors, more of a spin-doctor than a seer. His
legitimate points are marred by hyperbole, and he presents the facts
of cases selectively or not at all. In short, while what he says con-
tains bits of truth, it is characterized by distortion.
Take, for example, Professor Graglia's discussion of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,' where he wonders, "How can a preference for
educated and intelligent employees over employees who are less so
violate a prohibition of racial discrimination?"' 3 (Note the spin.)
Nowhere in his discussion of the case does he make note of the fact
that Duke Power had functioned for years without education re-
quirements or, as he calls them, "intelligence conditions."" It should
be enough to make most people curious that Duke Power's adoption
of these requirements coincided with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.5 That these facially neutral requirements operated to
sustain a situation that pre-dated the Act, a situation in which
blacks were segregated into the most menial and low-paying 'jobs,
does not spark the least bit of suspicion in the professor's mind. The
naivete seems a little forced.
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258 (1990).
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Professor Graglia also engages in distortion when he says that the
Court found education and testing requirements unlawful "because
they had the effect of making a larger proportion of blacks than of
whites ineligible for the positions to which the criteria applied."'
This is simply not true. The Court held as it did because it believed
that the requirements had been adopted for an entirely discrimina-
tory purpose, a purpose that they were achieving. This is known as
racial discrimination. Professor Graglia's presentation of the holding
in Griggs typifies his habit of telling the half of the story that suits
his purpose.
Still, Professor Graglia's challenge is a welcome one. His ap-
proach to the issues of racial discrimination and civil rights epito-
mizes the widespread doubt that is felt toward these subjects in our
society today. The challenge that the professor represents is one that
people in the civil rights movement (if there still is such a thing)
must answer if they hope to restore the movement's credibility.
They have not yet done so. This is a serious matter, despite what
Professor Graglia says; fairness and basic justice are at stake. The
discrimination at Duke Power was real enough, and if Professor
Graglia and his ilk are so agnostic that only open, naked discrimina-
tion will convince them, then liberals (if there still are any) must
show them that discrimination sometimes comes in disguises.
Assuming, arguendo, that employment discrimination is not al-
ways open and is sometimes achieved by devious or even inadvertent
means, then "business necessity" and "job-relatedness" seem the
only ways to ferret it out. Contrary to Professor Graglia's assertion,
disparate impact theory does not "convert(] . . . a prohibition of
racial discrimination into a requirement of racial preferences." '7 Dis-
parate impact theory is a quasi-evidentiary principle. The disparate
impact of an employment criterion is never in and of itself a viola-
tion of Title VII. It is a means of proving such a violation. If an
employer can show how a practice that excludes a protected group
is legitimately related to the job in question, the employer has suc-
cessfully rebutted the presumption against it. Thus, a magazine
publisher who required all his copy editors to pass an editing test
would prevail if sued by the members of a group who were con-
stantly scoring low on the test. Here, Professor Graglia would argue
that the publisher should be able to test the would-be copyeditors'
6. Id. at 1123.
7. Id. at 1133.
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knowledge of Beethoven, wood-carving, golf, or anything else that
caught his fancy. The "business necessity" doctrine, as I understand
it, would permit such tests assuming (1) that they did not have a
discriminatory effect or (2) that the magazine's subject was music,
wood-carving, or golf.
All this strikes Professor Graglia as outrageous. In his view, em-
ployers should be able to require anything they please of applicants
in the interest of improving the quality of the workforce. This is
fine, so long as we have no interest in ridding the workplace of dis-
crimination. Interestingly, the professor finds himself unable to
fathom the phrase, "the touchstone is business necessity." 8 Yet the
meaning of what it is that would "generally improve the overall
quality of the workforce"9 is crystal clear to him. (I sort of think it's
the other way around.) But be that as it may, no doubt requiring
workers in a bicycle factory to have masters' degrees in a Romance
language would "improve the overall quality of the workforce."
What supervisor would not love to hear his workers tease each other
in Catalan? Presumably, this is what Professor Graglia means. Let's
have some quality, gosh darn it. It's been too long since we have. I
have some more ideas about improving workforce quality, like re-
quiring all law professors to be proficient at the saxophone, or to
have senses of humor. While these requirements may not be "job-
related," they would definitely improve the workforce by ensuring
that law students would have professors who were imaginative, soul-
ful, and funny. Why do I get the feeling that then, in an epiphanic
moment, Professor Graglia would discover what "job-relatedness"
meant?
Eric W. Herman
8. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
9. Id.
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